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Abstract 
 
Asset-backed securitization (ABS) has become a viable and increasingly attractive risk 
management and refinancing method either as a standalone form of structured finance or as 
securitized debt in Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). However, the absence of industry 
standardization has prevented rising investment demand from translating into market liquidity 
comparable to traditional fixed income instruments, in all but a few selected market segments. 
Particularly low financial transparency and complex security designs inhibit profound analysis 
of secondary market pricing and how it relates to established forms of external finance. This 
paper represents the first attempt to measure the intertemporal, bivariate causal relationship 
between matched price series of equity and ABS issued by the same entity. In a two-
dimensional linear system of simultaneous equations we investigate the short-term dynamics 
and long-term consistency of daily secondary market data from the U.K. Sterling ABS/MBS 
market and exchange traded shares between 1998 and 2004 with and without the presence of 
cointegration. Our causality framework delivers compelling empirical support for a strong co-
movement between matched price series of ABS-equity pairs, where ABS markets seem to 
contribute more to price discovery over the long run. Controlling for cointegration, risk-free 
interest and average market risk of corporate debt hardly alters our results. However, once we 
qualify the magnitude and direction of price discovery on various security characteristics, such 
as the ABS asset class, we find that ABS-equity pairs with large-scale CMBS/RMBS and credit 
card/student loan ABS reveal stronger lead-lag relationships and joint price dynamics than 
whole business ABS. 
 
Keywords: co-movement, causality test, vector autoregression (VAR), vector error correction 
mechanism (VECM), short-term price dynamics, price discovery, asset-backed securities (ABS), 
securitization, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), collateralized debt obligation (CDO), captive 
finance, Pfandbrief, cointegration 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Research question 
 
In integrated and efficient capital markets financial assets with similar risk characteristics 
should yield similar expected returns, so investors expect to earn similar risk-adjusted returns 
on comparable exposures. Likewise, we also observe a consistent and close pairwise association 
between market prices of different state-contingent claims when their value depends on the 
same underlying asset generating process, such as the empirical relationship between bonds and 
stocks. The emergence of alternative off-balance sheet (structured) finance begs the question 
whether asset-backed securities (ABS) also share a similar pattern of intertemporal association 
with the market value of the issuing firm. This paper examines whether price co-movement 
does exist between publicly traded equity and default sensitive asset-backed securities (ABS) 
issued by the same entity – and if so, whether lower agency cost of asymmetric information of 
securitized debt improves price discovery. Past research on the empirical relationship of issued 
claims and securities on similar exposures has been limited to traditional on-balance sheet asset 
classes.  
 
The investigation of the empirical relationship between ABS and equity of the same issuer has 
topical appeal. The substitution of market-based external finance for credit finance through 
asset securitization has developed into an increasingly attractive risk management and 
refinancing method. The emergence of new forms of external finance has only recently urged a 
more thorough investigation into the asset correlation and possible causal interaction between 
different asset claims on similar exposure, e.g. cash markets (e.g. corporate bonds) and 
structured finance (e.g. credit default swaps (CDS)). In a three-dimensional autoregressive 
specification of bond, equity and CDS prices of the same issuer Norden and Weber (2004b) 
corroborate previous studies by Blanco et al. (2004) and Zhu (2004), who find that CDS and 
equity prices are cointegrated over the long run and share a stationary difference series under 
the assumption of no arbitrage.
1 In earlier studies, Houwelling and Vorst (2001) and Hull et al. 
(2003) specifically explore the credit risk pricing between the bond and CDS markets and find 
                                                 
1 Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) apply a similar set-up for their analysis of equity prices, CDS prices and 
bond spreads in emerging markets based on a limited dataset on several sovereigns.    4 
little price discrepancy if swap rates are chosen as benchmark risk-free rates. Empirical 
evidence on the lead-lag relationship in capital markets suggests primary price discovery in the 
CDS market
2 (especially in capital market-based financial systems and liquid CDS markets on 
large firms) and price adjustment in bond and equity markets. So far, however, no research 
study has attempted to account for price dynamics of ABS and equity markets for loss of 
available and suitable market data. 
 
ABS tranches provide opportunities of active arbitrage through both put-call-parity replication 
of equity and can be structured to match the asset correlation of other conventional 
investments and indices. Nonetheless, the primary and secondary markets of ABS still exhibit 
certain shortcomings: (i) the notoriously complex security design of multi-layered synthetic 
transactions and the lack of rigorous standardization (Rutledge, 2005) impairs fair asset pricing 
and restricts informed investment; (ii) the dominance of a few players (mainly banks, 
institutional investors and other money managers) is a deterrent to the lending width in the 
market; (iii) investors prevent market deepening by holding ABS deals until maturity (“buy 
and hold”); (iv) the absence of comprehensive trading platforms inhibits efficient information 
dissemination across different segments of capital markets; and (v) low retail participation 
impedes greater diversification of ABS demand across the financial system. The upshot of all of 
these features dulls the efficiency of price discovery in ABS markets and largely compromises the 
adequate specification of price dynamics.
3 
 
In this paper we investigate the intertemporal, bivariate causal relationship between matched 
equity and ABS prices of the same issuer. In efficient financial markets, we would expect state 
                                                 
2 Note that Norden and Weber (2004a) as well as Hull et al. (2003) also find strong evidence that the 
CDS market anticipates credit rating announcements (particularly negative rating events) of up to three 
months and more, whereas equity and bond markets register a much short reaction time to changes in 
credit quality. 
3 Although the Dow Jones iTraxx® index of CDS obligations and the iBoxx® index of collateralized debt 
obligations have inaugurated the first round of emerging standardization, large parts of the ABS market 
have shed little of their frequently deplored opacity. Market observers point to the changing hedging 
patterns for customized ABS claims in advent of liquid pricing benchmarks (Tsui, 2005). For instance, 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) are generally structured to meet specific investor needs. In the 
past, issuers would hedge unbalanced positions through complex subordinated, multi-tranche structures 
(“transaction-based”), whose complexity inhibited transparent asset pricing. Now, standardized claims 
on liquid indices (e.g. Dow Jones iTraxx®)
3 offer a base correlation measure (“CDO delta”) for the 
“market-based” hedging of bespoke and mostly privately transacted single-tranche transactions (arranged 
for single investors) or multi-tranche transactions with mezzanine tranches indexed to equity prices.    5 
contingent financial claims with different risk exposure but identical (or very similar) 
underlying fundamental assets to share a cointegration relationship with a difference stationary 
(base) series. In keeping with technically related work on price co-movement in CDS and bond 
markets, we adopt vector autoregression methods with and without cointegration restriction 
(VAR and VECM) to support a comprehensive (non-structural) causality test framework of 
random disturbances on a linear, two-dimensional system of simultaneous autoregressive 
equations of time-varying means. We also employ traditional (linear) Granger causality testing 
to investigate the presence of linear predictive power of past price movements in pairwise 
issuer-matched price series in both markets. We define the short-term dynamics and long-term 
consistency of co-movement between matched ABS and equity prices as jointly determined by 
the lagged polynomials of past observations and individual price adjustments of each asset class 
after controlling for risk-free interest and the market price of risk. In particular, we study the 
efficiency of price discovery in response to changes in the quality of issuers and their 
securitized debt. Our approach improves short-term univariate forecasts of price movements 
in each market and reveals whether the asset correlation and the joint dynamics associated 
with the causal interaction of cointegrated price movements significantly inform the price 
formation in each market over time. We apply our methodology to a dataset of actual market 
prices covering a pool of 68 matched pairs of U.K. ABS and equity price series over a time 
period of more than five years. Although we qualify the degree and direction of price 
discovery on various security characteristics of selected ABS, such as issue (credit) quality, 
maturity and securitized asset class (whole business ABS vs. CMBS/RMBS/other ABS), the 
lack of fundamental information about the credit-linkage of securitized assets to the 
operational performance of the issuer does not permit fully efficient pricing of ABS and equity 
under equivalence conditions within integrated capital markets. Nonetheless, our 
methodology yields stylized facts about price discovery in both markets over time, which 
might guide future theoretical and empirical research into potential divergence in price 
discovery between different capital market sectors. 
 
Several new issues emerge from our research. We find only weak empirical support for the 
argument that the joint dynamics of ABS and equity prices improve univariate, short-run 
predictions of future price movements. Notwithstanding this result, the lead-lag relationship of 
ABS and equity prices over the long run is statistically and economically meaningful, with    6 
ABS markets dominating price discovery. If we test for cross-sectional sensitivity of error 
correction, we find that that the strength of long-term intertemporal causality and the relative 
importance of ABS markets seem to vary substantially by rating, maturity and asset type of 
ABS issue.
4 The VAR-based specification of co-movement between ABS and equity pairs 
indicates that the contribution of ABS markets to price discovery is substantially stronger for 
CMBS/RMBS/other ABS than whole business ABS. Despite the robustness of our findings to 
the order of cointegration, cross-sectional variation in the intertemporal relationship between 
ABS and equity prices warrants more empirical and theoretical research. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews our proposed methodology and 
links the time series properties of our sample to previous findings in the literature. The 
subsequent sections present the properties of our data set and the technical specifications of 
various causality tests. After a thorough discussion of our results, the paper concludes with a 
summary of significant findings and recommendations for possible extensions, improvements 
and further research. 
 
1.2  Research motivation 
 
On the heels of Standard & Poor’s recent downgrading of General Motors Corp. and Ford 
Motor Co. to non-investment grade status, a drumbeat of warnings about the soundness of the 
economic reasoning and risk measurement standards of Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDOs). Subsequent haircut unwinding of CDO positions exposed to these corporate 
downgrades has investors and regulators worrying about the resilience of these leveraged 
structured claims to potentially risky corporate debt as reference assets in times of stress. This 
recent unfolding of events has been anticipated by incipient theoretical and empirical research 
on the valuation of CDOs (Gibson, 2004; Egami and Esteghamat, 2003; Jobst, 2002 and 2005a; 
Duffie and Gârleanu, 2001 and 1999), which looks for potential trouble spots in this segment 
of fixed income markets. Over the last few years the CDO market has been the fastest growing 
area of structured finance. Generally, a CDO represents a form of asset-backed securitization 
(ABS), which converts large pools of mostly illiquid exposures into commoditized structured 
claims issued as tradable capital market debt instruments. The conventional security design of 
                                                 
4 The type of ABS could also serve as proxy of degree of insulation of securitized exposures from issuer    7 
CDOs with tranche subordination as risk sharing mechanism induces a leverage effect on 
constituent tranches, whose distinct risk-return profiles can be tailored to specific investment 
preferences.
5  Synthetic CDOs are classified as “hybrid” risk transfer instruments and credit 
derivatives in a wider sense (see Fig. 1). In contrast to cash CDOs, they enlist wads of credit 
derivatives to create partially funded and highly leverage investment from synthetic claims on 
the performance of designated credit exposures (Jobst, 2003). Whereas the classification “pure 
credit derivatives” only applies to credit default swaps (CDSs), total return swaps and credit 
spread options, unfunded/partially funded structured finance transactions, synthetic CDOs 
straddle the indistinct boundary between securitization and credit derivatives. The synthetic 
assembly of credit exposures and the composition of derivative elements in complex, 
subordinated CDO transactions pose interesting questions about the valuation and price 
formation of leveraged credit risk transfer mechanisms in structured finance. 
Risk Transfer Instruments Risk Transfer Instruments
Traditional Products Traditional Products Capital Market Products Capital Market Products
Credit Insurance
Syndicated Loans Credit Derivatives
(pure)
Credit Derivatives
(pure) Securitisation Securitisation Other Instruments Other Instruments
Asset-Backed Securitisation (ABS)
Mortgage-Backed Securitisation (MBS)
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO)
Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLO)
Collateralised Bond Obligations (CBO)
Hybrid Products Hybrid Products
Credit-linked Notes (CLN)
Synthetic CDOs
Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
Total Return Swaps
Credit Spread Options
Loan Sales
Bond Trading
Asset Swaps
Credit Derivatives 
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CDSs as reference asset
Tranche-specific CDSs
“Regular Hybrids” “Regular Hybrids” “Pools of Pools- Hybrids” “Pools of Pools- Hybrids”
“CDOs of CDOs (of CDOs)”
“CDOs of ABSs”
 
Fig. 1. Overview of risk transfer instruments (adapted from Effenberger (2003)). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the ABS investor’s participation in the issuer’s future operational performance in many instances. 
5 Although investors should expect the same returns for CDOs as for similar credit risk exposure in 
plain vanilla debt, the risk profile of CDO tranches varies dramatically in response to changes in the 
valuation of the underlying (reference) asset (Jobst, 2005b).    8 
The flexible structure of synthetic CDOs allows issuers to devise almost an infinite number of 
ways to combine various asset classes in order to both transfer asset risk by shortening the 
notional amount of designated asset exposures and to arbitrage “spreads between different debt 
markets, between debt of different issuers, between different classes of debt on a single 
company’s balance sheet” (Shepherd, 2005) or between comparable securities on similar 
fundamental asset values. Actually, the unfunded combination of distinct contingent claims is 
essential to turning asset correlation of selected securities into a tradable asset class, which can 
be leveraged depending on the seniority of investment. This property of CDOs had led to the 
emergence of growing interest in asset correlation and price dynamics between different 
investment products in the bid to detect and exploit pricing anomalies of credit risk. Besides 
CDSs, many CDO structures also include seasoned ABS deals in “pools of pools” reference 
portfolios (“CDOs of ABSs” or “CDO
2”).
6 Hence, the asset correlation and the joint price 
dynamics of ABS prices and other traded security prices are fundamental to the development 
of robust forecasting models for dynamic portfolio adjustment and the risk management of 
synthetically composed credit exposures and their dynamic adjustment over time. 
 
Since ABS can be issued as a standalone asset class or included in a more evolved combination 
of structured claims,  the price dynamics of ABS as senior debt claims on the securitized 
exposures also involve important aspects of corporate finance and capital structure choice. 
Reference assets underlying ABS transactions are typically “fenced out” from the total asset 
value of the issuer. Depending on the transaction structure of various types of ABS (true sale 
vs. synthetic), securitized claims can preserve a very close economic and legal association with 
the issuer’s asset value changes. Moreover, many issuers of ABS retain an equity claim as a 
highly leveraged call option on the residual value of securitized exposures,  which constitutes a 
reservation utility upon maturity if realized losses fall short of expected losses. The linkage of 
ABS reference assets to the asset performance of the issuer, determines the strength of the 
empirical relationship between ABS and equity claims. It also indicates whether the option-
pricing theory (OPT)-based correlation of debt and equity valuation (Merton, 1974) applies to 
the market prices of ABS tranches and equity issued by one and the same entity. 
                                                 
6 “In many instances, investors in CDOs that also include well-diversified ABS deals (alongside 
individual asset exposures) in their underlying portfolios might unwittingly compromise their 
diversification at the margin. This is because the pooling of diversified securitized exposures might    9 
 
1.2.1  Relationship between bond prices, ABS prices and equity 
 
In synthetic CDO and ABS transactions with on-balance sheet reference assets, the intuition 
behind the empirical relation of securitized debt and equity claims can be assessed within the 
theoretical valuation of balance sheet identities in the context of the capital structure-based 
option pricing theory (OPT) by Merton (1974).
7 According to Merton’ structural model, owners 
of corporate equity in leveraged firms have the option to default if their firm’s asset value 
(reference asset) declines below the cumulative face value of outstanding debt (strike price). So, 
corporate bond investors effectively write European put options to equity owners, who hold a 
residual claim on the firm’s asset value (see Appendix I). The factors that determine the 
riskiness of debt are the duration, the leverage of the firm and asset value volatility. Hence, 
equity and debt are always positively correlated. Their correlation increases in higher default 
risk and leverage, which imply a higher probability that the asset value of the firm will drop 
below the default threshold. Bond and equity prices should also be cointegrated and share an 
equilibrium price relationship. 
 
Fig. 2 illustrates the stylized profile of equity and bond prices of a leveraged firm with a 
notional amount of outstanding debt (“default threshold”) D. The firm is in default if its asset 
value falls below the notional amount of outstanding debt. The correlation between bonds and 
equity declines asymptotically to zero. By keeping the debt level constant, if the firm is low-
rated and operates at a high risk of default, the chances of both equity holders and creditors 
being affected by bankruptcy are high, so we would expect a high correlation between bonds 
and equity (see Fig. 2) as we traverse levels of asset value that warrant a low credit rating. At a 
sufficiently high firm asset value, the distance to default reaches a level, at which the chances of 
bankruptcy become remote and the correlation between bonds and equity tapers off.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
actually increase the conditional probability of default for systemic risk events and backfire on investors 
when default correlation increases even slightly (Jobst, 2005b).” 
7 Although the same intuition applies, we acknowledge different economic significance depending on 
the structural characteristics of ABS.    10 
DD ' EABS
DABS + EABS
1
2
Asset Value
E
q
u
i
t
y
/
B
o
n
d
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
E
B
B'
E'
low-rated high-rated
DABS
D
s
e
n
i
o
r
D
m
e
z
z
.
ρ(E,B)
default after ABS
default
 
Fig. 2. Payoff profile of equity and bond prices before and after securitization according to OPT. 
 
The different state-contingent payoff functions of equity and debt claims on firm value in the 
traditional capital structure choice of on-balance sheet funding cause agency costs of 
asymmetric information. Debt represents a disciplinary device to prevent non-value 
maximizing managers from implicitly transferring wealth from creditors to equity holders 
(“asset substitution”) if they engaged in sub-optimal risky investments at a too low a level of 
debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, an excessive debt burden induces the opportunity 
cost of abandoning profitable future investment opportunities (“underinvestment problem” 
(Myers, 1977 and 1984)). Asset securitization might redress these conflicts of interest between 
creditors and shareholders (Stulz and Johnson, 1985), because it allows issuers to appropriate 
partial debt holder wealth by carving out a defined pool of reference assets to satisfy 
securitized debt claims, which capture ex ante gains from the firm’s future asset value. 
Thereby, issuers subordinate existing creditors and render existing debt less inhibitive on the 
realization of new investment opportunities.
8 The bankruptcy level increases to D’ (even if the 
reference assets are sold off-balance, which would shrink the total asset base of the issuing 
firm). Our illustration also shows that the issuance of ABS discounts future asset value of 
                                                 
8 This effect ultimately depends on the way the investment policy guides the riskiness of the use of 
securitization proceeds relative to the riskiness of the issuer before the securitization issue (Jobst, 2005c).    11 
securitized exposures, whose pay-offs would have otherwise accrued to equity holders if the 
firm does not default at maturity. The correlation between bond and equity prices should still 
persist and be consistent over time, though at different statistical significance and higher asset 
values of the firm, if the issuing firm retains appreciable default risk after the ABS transaction. 
 
Also note that positive correlation due to the issuer’s proximity to bankruptcy coincides with 
the notion of securitization as a preferred form of external finance if issuers face high capital 
costs of internal funds according to the pecking-order (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and debt trade-
off theories of capital structure choice under asymmetric information.
9 In keeping with the 
pecking-order theory,
10 lower agency cost from valuation uncertainty renders securitized debt 
safer than straight debt, as the value of the insulated reference portfolio can be assessed more 
precisely than the issuer’s firm value. Since capital market investors in securitization 
transactions receive their payment directly from a diversified pool of asset exposures insulated 
from the issuer, securitized debt carries lower agency cost. Hence, debt holders of ABS would 
require less information about the issuing firm than debt holders of (unsecured) corporate 
bonds or equity holders to make an equally informed assessment about the fundamental asset 
value. So, the analysis of the intertemporal relation between ABS and equity prices is 
tantamount to gauging the joint price dynamics of asset classes with different degrees of 
informed investment for a certain capital structure decision. 
 
1.2.2  Sensitivity of securitized debt to the issuer’s asset value 
 
ABSs do not reflect the present value of any gains from the firm’s future investment income 
outside the reference portfolio. However, the credit risk associated with their estimated future 
repayment is indicative of the issuer’s asset quality. Almost all securitization transactions 
maintain a significant degree of economic and/or legal association with the original issuer. In 
                                                 
9 The pecking order theory states that firms prefer internal to external finance due to adverse selection 
arising from information asymmetry in financial relationships between insiders and outsiders. Without 
asset securitization firms with high internal refinancing cost and low bankruptcy cost generally prefer 
debt to equity because of lower information costs from valuation uncertainty. In contrast, the trade-off 
theory postulates that managers choose a leverage level, where the marginal benefit of debt, such as the 
interest tax shield, just outweighs the costs of debt, including agency and financial distress cost (“optimal 
trade-off”). 
10 Additionally, securitized debt does not carry restrictive bond covenants and might be easier to 
negotiate.    12 
contrast, equity claims derive their value as a call option on current and future operational 
gains from overall issuer performance above some bankruptcy threshold. Given these 
characteristics, the strength of the price relationship between equity and ABS issues is expected 
to depend on the security design of ABS. In the case of synthetic structures, for instance, the 
issuer retains so-called credit-linkage to securitized exposures, and the ABS will be exposed to 
the counterparty risk emanating from the volatility of the issuing firm’s value over time.
11 In 
the alternative case of a true sale transaction with a complete legal transfer of selected asset 
exposures, it is commonplace to observe first loss coverage by issuers as a structural support 
mechanism to mitigate agency costs of asymmetric information. Here, the market price of 
ABS is contingent on whether the asset value of the issuing firm implies adequate financial 
capacity to support first loss coverage.
12 The upshot is that we expect the strength of the 
intertemporal relationship of ABS to the distribution of the issuing firm’s value to depend on 
the linkage of securitized debt to issuer performance. 
 
1.3  Hypotheses 
 
The capital structure-based correlation of debt and equity as well as the sensitivity of 
securitized exposures to the asset value of the issuing entity establish a sound theoretical 
foundation to the joint price dynamics of securitized debt and equity. We ascribe great 
importance to both the economic linkage of securitized exposures to the future performance of 
the issuer and asset correlation of ABS and equity claims as possible constituent elements of 
synthetic CDOs. We apply these insights to a comprehensive analysis of the joint price 
dynamics of name-matched ABS and equity pairs to gain a better understanding of information 
processing in ABS markets vis-à-vis equity markets in response to changes in fundamental asset 
value of issuers. Our research motivation delivers three complementary hypotheses, which 
substantiate the economic plausibility of an intertemporal causal relation between equity and 
ABS prices. 
                                                 
11 Depending on the funding level of this type of ABS structure, credit default swaps (CDS) form an 
integral part of the security design and contribute largely to a very close association between securitized 
debt and the issuer valuation, if the issuer retains the role of default protection provider with or without 
provisions of legal recourse in credit events. 
12 The market value of ABS is derived from a pre-defined stream of present or future proceeds (“cash 
flow ABS”, e.g. “whole business ABS”) or a diversified reference portfolio of existing or future asset 
exposures, which have either been randomly drawn from a population of own assets (“balance sheet 
ABS”) or acquired for the sole purpose of securitization (“arbitrage ABS”).     13 
 
Hypothesis 1: If we rule out any ABS transaction that would increase the issuer’s liabilities beyond 
its asset value, securitized debt is positively correlated with equity of the same issuer and both share a 
long-term equilibrium price relationship. Since structural models ascribe higher call option value to 
equity the higher the duration of outstanding debt, the firm leverage and the volatility of firm assets, 
low-rated issuers and/or issuers that operate close to bankruptcy exhibit a stronger degree of 
correlation than highly-rated issuers.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The type of ABS defines the proximity of ABS debt to the asset value process of the 
issuer. The closer the economic and/or legal association between securitized exposures and the issuer 
(e.g. project finance, whole business securitization), the more sensitive securitized debt will be to 
changes in the fundamental asset value of the issuer. In this case we find economically strong and 
statistically meaningful long-term consistency between price movements of equity and securitized 
debt. 
 
Hypothesis 3: We expect ABS markets to lead equity markets in price discovery of the fair market 
value of firm performance. Outside investors can assess the fair value of ABS more easily than the 
value of other forms of external finance, mainly because securitized debt is specifically issued on the 
back of designated exposures. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Given Hypotheses 2 and 3, ABS transactions with a close economic and/or legal 
association to the asset value of the issuer better inform the price formation of corresponding equity 
than other types of ABS, such as CMBS and RMBS issues. 
 
2  DATASET 
 
Although asset-backed securitization has established itself as an increasingly attractive 
structured finance mechanism for investors looking for greater diversification and lower risk 
exposure than with traditional corporate bonds, rising investment demand has yet failed to 
translate into a level of market liquidity comparable to conventional fixed income markets. 
Hence, reliable trading data of securitized debt as a truthful reflection of market price 
volatility is hard to come by. For this analysis, we were granted access to a proprietary    14 
database of market prices collected by a major European commercial bank as a syndicated 
member of the iBoxx®  b o n d  i n d e x .  W e  o b t a i n e d  m o r e  t h a n  f i v e  y e a r s  w o r t h  o f  d a i l y
13 
secondary market (indicative) bid quotes of fixed-interest tranches of U.K. Sterling-
denominated ABS (“Sterling ABS/MBS”), one of the most actively traded ABS asset class in 
Europe (see Fig. 1).
14 We reconciled these ABS price series with the price information of 
exchange-traded equity issued by the same exchange-listed entities (see Fig. 2). We also 
collected the U.K. bond benchmark with a 15-year weighted average maturity from Bloomberg 
and the 3-month LIBOR
15 on U.K. Sterling deposits from Thomson Financial Datastream. Our 
initial ABS panel data set covered the daily quoted security (bid) prices (250 working days p.a.) 
of a maximum of 1,405 observations from 1 September 1998 to 24 January 2004 of 149 
individual tranches of 104 U.K. Sterling denominated ABS and MBS transactions. We were 
able to obtain specific ABS security information, such as issuer name, tranche specification 
(class of note), issue date, original rating, principal value, coupon rate (fixed), maturity date, 
domicile of securitized assets, type of ABS transactions [whole business ABS, captive finance 
ABS, CMBS, RMBS (prime), multi-borrower ABS, equipment leasing ABS, credit card ABS, 
student loan ABS], denomination of securitized assets, and ISIN
16). The time series of observed 
price quotes was complete in all but a few instances. We substitute for missing observations of 
daily price information by linear interpolation (Hull et al., 2003). We eliminated four defaulted 
or matured tranches from the database, leaving us with a total number of 145 ABS tranches of 
78 transactions. 
 
Subsequently, we verified the availability of shares prices of as many issuers of ABS 
transactions as possible to create matched ABS-equity pairs. A combined query of various 
                                                 
13 Similar to Blanco et al. (2004) and Zhu (2004) in their studies on the leading role of CDS prices in 
price formation of default risk we contest the appropriateness of measuring the short-term dynamic 
interactions on weekly price observations in Longstaff et al. (2003). 
14 The data used in our study is not explicitly supported by actual trades and should be viewed as 
indicative “matrix” quotes offered by the data provider as bid prices. Hence, our price information 
might partly reflect an information advantage enjoyed by the data provider as major broker in the 
Sterling ABS/MBS market. 
15 We choose the 3-month LIBOR, mainly because it is used as base index/reference rate for adjustable 
rate ABS tranches in the Sterling ABS/MBS market. 
16 The International Securities Identifying Number (ISIN) uniquely identifies a fungible security, whose 
structure is defined in ISO 6166. Securities with ISIN coding can be debt securities, equities, options, 
derivatives and futures. ISINs consist of two alphabetic characters, which are the ISO 3166-1 code for 
the issuing country, nine numeric digits (the National Securities Identifying Number (NSIN), which 
identifies the security), and one numeric checksum digit.    15 
sources, including Reuters, Bloomberg, Thomson Financial Datastream, Yahoo Finance and The 
Financial Times Online generated only 36 issuers (or parent companies of issuers in case of 
consolidated subsidiaries and/or lines of business) of our ABS data set, which were publicly 
listed at the London Stock Exchange (LSE) or at other exchanges (in the case of foreign parent 
companies of U.K.-domiciled issuers).
17 We were able to assign equity price series (end-of-day 
mid-quotes) to a corresponding set of 81 ABS tranches of 42 ABS transactions.
18 55 out of all 81 
ABS tranches issued by exchange-traded entities (or their parent company) were classified as 
whole business ABS, project finance (captive finance) ABS or other ABS (e.g. credit cards and 
student loans), whereas the remaining 26 tranches were either CMBS or RMBS. We finally 
excluded another set of 11 ABS series (from five individual transactions), which shared only a 
small time window of price observations with the matched equity series, rendering it useless 
for co-movement analysis. After elimination of two further ABS-equity pairs due to level 
persistence in order to avoid biased estimation results, our final data sample consisted of 68 
matched ABS-equity pairs (with 31 different issuers of 38 ABS transactions). 
 
We distinguish between ABS transactions in matched ABS-equity pairs by ABS properties 
(type of ABS asset class, rating category and maturity) to analyze the cross-sectional sensitivity 
of our estimation results. ABS-equity pairs with different ABS asset classes might exhibit 
different price co-movement due to a higher degree of association of equity and ABS prices in 
the case of whole business and captive finance ABS (“whole business ABS”) as opposed to 
RMBS, CMBS and other ABS (student loans, credit cards, equipment leasing, multi-borrower) 
transactions (“CMBS/RMBS/other ABS”),
19 which are mostly issued by financial institutions 
or large parent/holding companies. We conjecture that the market pricing of the latter type of 
ABS might be less sensitive to equity price changes; yet, higher market liquidity and greater 
transparency of CMBS/RMBS could also engender stronger joint price dynamics.  
 
                                                 
17 Equity price series of seven non-U.K. issuers (Eurohypo AG, Württembergische Hypothekenbank AG, 
MBNA America Bank, N.A., SLM (Student Loan Marketing Association) Corp., Allmerica Financial 
Corporation (AFC), MBNA Bank Corp., Capital One Bank Corp.) were obtained from the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the Frankfurt-based Deutsche Börse (German Stock Exchange). We subsequently 
converted the local currency-denominated stock prices into Pound Sterling at the applicable exchange 
rate. 
18 Note that we retained several ABS transactions in our data set that were issued by the same entity 
and/or included two or more constituent fixed-rate tranches.    16 
We record the rating classification of each ABS tranche and form a composite rating a 
consensus view of an initial issue rating in cases when two or even three rating agencies have 
assigned tranche ratings (see Tab. 1) to identify the overall rating. Most tranches are rated by 
all three rating agencies (30), with 41, 44 and 64 tranches being rated by Moody’s, S&P and 
Fitch respectively. Only 11 tranches are rated by just one rating agency. If tranches are rated 
by at least two rating agencies, they are more likely to have been rated by Fitch and either 
S&P or Moody’s. A lower incidence of joint ratings by Moody’s and S&P conforms to the 
notion that many issuers of ABS elect either of the two divergent rating approaches by 
Moody’s or S&P as primary rating agency to obtain the most favorable rating. The Fitch 
rating could be thought of as a third-party “seal of approval”. The mean and median composite 
ratings of all ABS tranches in the total sample are 4.16 (AA-, Aa3) and 3.00 (AA, Aa2) on our 
numeric rating scale, with the highest rating classification 1.00 (AAA/Aaa) being most 
common.
20 
 
3  METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to test for the existence of a price equilibrium our methodology follows a sequence of 
analytical procedures commensurate to the incidence of possible cointegration relations in the 
joint dynamics of K number of price series. If  K k = , the time series of all variables in our 
sample are level stationary, and the use of unrestricted VAR specification of price dynamics 
without a cointegration vector is warranted. If  K k < − ≤ 1 1 , one series is first order 
differentiable so that at least one cointegration vector (i.e. difference stationarity) exists. This 
case requires a cointegration restriction of VAR in the form of a VECM specification or a 
Granger causality test procedure if the individual series are also level stationarity.
21 Finally, if 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 We adopt this broad distinction of ABS asset classes in the further analysis of cross-sectional variation 
of estimation results. 
20 The total sample of ABS-equity pairs only includes ABS tranches without past rating events (rating 
change or rating watch). Failure to do so might otherwise bias our discriminatory analysis of cross-
sectional sensitivity of intertemporal error correction in cointegrated series. 
21 The linear representation of an equilibrium price relation has proven to be inadequate for non-
stationarity time series (Granger and Newbold, 1974). The alternative hypothesis of significant 
explanatory power in conventional inference procedures (e.g. ordinary least squares (OLS)) might 
actually flag an non-existing empirical relation between two variables, which drift away from the initial 
value with an individually time-varying trend. In this case, also the linear Granger causality testing 
procedure is biased. Hence, if we observe variables with a unit root, the existence of cointegration is 
needed to establish incontrovertible evidence of long-term price consistency between time series.    17 
0 = k  all series are at least first order integrated. In this case, we would calculate VAR 
estimates on first difference of price series data.  
 
Since inference procedures of standard parametric models assume non-integration and level 
stationarity of both dependent and explanatory variables, we analyze each time series for 
individual stationarity at level and first differences by means of unit root tests. Based on a 
linear price relationship of stationary series, we complete the traditional Granger test of any 
linear predictive power in the (short-term) price dynamics of pairwise matched equity and ABS 
prices for each issuer. We relax the stationarity requirement in favor of long-term economic 
causality through cointegration. We examine the presence of cointegration in the long-term 
relationship between equity and ABS price series in order to control for possible biased 
inference procedures in a linear specification of higher order integrated pairwise time series.  
 
The concept of cointegration is defined as the stationary linear combination of two time series 
(Johansen and Juselius, 1990; Engle and Granger, 1987), whose long-run equilibrium 
relationship converges to a difference stationary series, i.e. the values of the linear combination 
of as coefficients of the cointegration vector are centered around a mean and have a constant 
variance.
22 So if the constituent price series are first-order integrated and share a cointegration 
relationship, the equivalence relationship between both markets on an equilibrium price, holds 
and their difference series describes a stationary process. In other words, as we drop the 
stationarity condition of individual series, the existence of cointegration allows us to test for a 
long-term empirical price relationship and empirical causality of short-term price adjustments. 
We adopt a vector-based simultaneous equation model of autoregressive specification to study 
the intertemporal causal interaction of both markets with and without the presence of long-
term cointegration. We use VAR and VECM as appropriate econometric tools for measuring 
the speed and the degree of price discovery in these markets. 
 
                                                 
22 So if two series follow a random walk I(1) process and their difference series is stationary, they are 
considered cointegrated. The order d of integration I(d) indicates the number of unit roots contained in 
a series and the number of differencing operations required to yield a stationary series. In the context of 
this paper, the co-integration of two financial series on the same underlying asset process eliminates a 
long-term arbitrage opportunity by shorting the overvalued asset to finance a long position in the 
undervalued asset.    18 
4  STATIONARITY AND COINTEGRATION  
 
Prior to the examination of the lead-lag relationship between equity and ABS prices in a 
causality framework of several simultaneous equation models, we need to examine the 
univariate stochastic properties of the price series in our sample. The price series could either 
exhibit mean reversion or conform to a random walk with a constant forecast value, 
conditional on time, and time-varying autocovariance, whose first order integration yields a 
stationary difference series. We choose classical unit root testing by Dickey and Fuller (1979 
and 1981) and Phillips and Perron (1987), the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-
Perron (PP) test statistics (Greene, 1993), to investigate the presence of mean reversion. These 
tests are based on a linear AR(p) model with  p number of lags, which considers all 
combinations of price sensitivity γ  to past mean prices and the significance of some resilient 
price level as drift. We run the ADF test with a linear trend on level and first differences of 
spreads of up to five lags in order to control for serial correlation. We also complete the PP 
test diagnostic corrected by the Newey-West autocorrelation consistent variance estimator, 
which accounts for the number of periods of serial correlation through six truncation lags. For 
both test we employ MacKinnon (1996) critical values for (one-sided) rejection of the unit root 
null hypothesis. We complement our analysis by testing for statistically significant residual 
autoregressive effects on the basis of the Llung-Box Q-statistic. As opposed to the most recent 
study on secondary market pricing in ABS/MBS markets (Koutmos, 2002), we find that the 
asset generating processes of both ABS and equity series are generally difference stationary. 
The sample mean and median values of the ADF and PP test statistics as well as high degrees of 
autocorrelation suggest that ABS price series especially defy level stationarity. Similar to earlier 
research on the price dynamics of U.S. ABS/MBS spreads, both ADF and PP test diagnostics 
strongly reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in all cases for ABS and equity prices at first 
difference. This implies stationary residual series with autocorrelation effects of up to five lags 
at most according to the Llung-Box Q-statistic. Since first order integration of individual equity 
and ABS price series yields stationary I(0) processes, our unit root test estimates suggest that 
equity and ABS prices share at least one unique co-integration vector, where a mean-reverting 
difference series with time-independent autocovariance suggests an intertemporal relationship 
of mutual price discovery. 
    19 
We identify market liquidity and data frequency as possible causes of slightly divergent 
stochastic properties across equity and ABS prices at level and first differences. Although our 
sample period stretches more than five years (from September 1998 to January 2004), varying 
lengths of price quote series for the various ABS transactions result in median (mean) of 698 
(683) observations over the sample period – about half the 1,404 (1,539) observations we 
obtained for the equity price of the corresponding issuers in question. Moreover, we find only 
weak and scarce statistical evidence of mean-reverting ABS prices. Whereas Koutmos (2002) 
used weekly time series data of more than 30 years to substantiate his findings on the level 
stationary of U.S. MBS spreads (grouped by rating classification and maturity), our shorter 
time horizon certainly inhibits the same degree of measurability of long range cycles of mean-
reversion, even though we are almost able to always match the absolute number of 
observations in his study. We also recognize that persistent stochastic processes over long 
spans of time with a small autoregressive component (due to low liquidity and infrequent 
trading activity) could bias the ADF and PP tests into rejecting the unit root in absence of 
strong statistical power against the alternative of level stationarity (Papell and Prodan, 2003).
23 
Although we do not observe “stale” price movements with autoregressive residuals, this might 
well be the case for our comparatively short time horizon of five years. We find that first order 
integration yields strong mean reversion, which in turn renders standard hypothesis testing 
appropriate for either ABS or equity prices at first differences with and without cointegration. 
 
In the effort to explain the long-term consistency of joint movements of equity and ABS prices 
we also test the pairwise time series data for the degree of correlation (see Tab. 2) and the 
existence of one or more cointegration vectors (see Tab. 3). We find that positive correlation is 
most prevalent in the sub-sample of ABS-equity pairs with either non-investment grade rated 
ABS or whole business ABS. This observation concurs our structural model-based hypotheses 
of higher correlation between debt and equity of low-rated issuers and issuers of ABS 
transactions that display a higher degree of proximity to the fundamental asset value process of 
the issuer, such as whole business ABS. However, the joint incidence of both characteristics 
yields a negative correlation value. We attribute this result to the uneven sample composition 
                                                 
23 The danger of type II error misspecification, which also operates in the presence of a nonlinear data 
generating process, has critical implications on the interpretation of ADF results for inference testing in 
the presence of a nonlinear data generating process. The linear specification of ADF biases the unit root 
test into rejecting the unit root hypothesis (Taylor, 2001; Taylor and Peel, 2000).    20 
buy cross-sectional characteristics of ABS-equity pairs. Since both ABS and equity price series 
reflect the market value of different security claims on the same asset generating process (albeit 
at different degrees of exposure and state contingency), we would expect their difference series 
to be first order integrated with a time-invariant mean and autocovariance. The existence of a 
cointegrating relationship is defined as  ,, it i i it B S α β = +  with  0 i α =  and  1 = i β  for each i-pair 
of ABS and equity series with prices  t B  and  t S . If we remove the cointegration restriction 
from the difference stationary series, long-term consistency of price co-movement toward an 
equilibrium price would yield the one-dimensional cointegration vector kx1, with vector 
[] 1 1 −  representing the simplest form of first order cointegration. We follow Johansen (1988, 
1991 and 1995) as well as Hansen and Joselius (1995) to examine the existence of statistically 
significant cointegration on the basis of the trace statistic, whose critical values are reported by 
Osterwald and Lenum (1992).
24 We find supporting evidence for at least one statistically 
significant cointegration vector at a 95% confidence level in 51 out of 68 cases of the total 
sample of matched ABS-equity pairs. Moreover, long-run price consistency between matched 
equity and ABS series appears to vary by ABS asset class, with the long-term price dynamics of 
whole business ABS diluting the economic and statistical significance of cointegration. While 
almost 80% of all ABS series of CMBS/RMBS are cointegrated with the corresponding equity 
price of their issuer at a statistical significance of 5% or lower, we observe a similar degree of 
cointegration only in 70% of all ABS series of whole business ABS. 
 
                                                 
24 The cointegration rank test by Johansen (1991) investigates the existence of a stationary linear 
combination of first order integrated time series on the basis of a VAR of 
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uncorrelated, zero mean i.i.d. residuals with covariance structures Ω  and Σ . The Johansen 
cointegration test evaluates the null hypothesis of no cointegration relation between the selected time 
series. We reject the null hypothesis if the coefficient matrix  αβ′ Π =  of  1 k×  vectors has reduced rank 
equal to 1 (H0: full rank equal to 2), with  β  being the cointegration vector. The existence of 
cointegrated time series gives rise to an equilibrium price relationship beyond possible linear bias in 
standard inference models.    21 
5  SHORT-TERM DYNAMIC LINKAGES AND LONG-TERM 
CONSISTENCY 
 
We break down our investigation of a possible empirical relationship between ABS and equity 
prices into short-term dynamic linkages and long-term consistency of intertemporal co-
movement. We first examine the short-term dynamics between equity and ABS prices without 
the requirement of cointegration in two different linear specifications of stationary series. 
Before we apply a two-dimensional vector autoregressive (VAR) model in a linear system of 
simultaneous equations to study price discovery in response to changes in the quality of issuers 
and their securitized debt, we resort to the traditional linear approach of Granger causality 
testing to better explain current and future price movements in ABS and equity markets on the 
basis of short-term joint (multivariate) price dynamics. 
 
5.1  Granger causality 
 
The Granger causality test is a non-vector forecasting alternative to VAR (see section 5.2 
below) and yields insights about the direction of the empirical relationship between equity and 
ABS prices, without imposing limitations on the long-run consistency of price dynamics. 
Granger (1969) defines the causality between two scalar-valued, stationary and ergodic time 
series { } t X  and { } t Y  on the grounds of significant reciprocal (autoregressive) influence of past 
information on the conditional probability distribution of  t X . Given the bivariate 
information set  1 t I −  defined as Lx-length lagged vector  ( ) 11 , ,...,
Lx
tL x tL x tL x t XX X X −− − + − ≡  of  t X  
(or in short a lag polynomial  ( ) 1 tx I L −  of  t X ) and an Ly-length lagged vector 
() 11 , ,...,
Ly
tL y tL x tL x t YY Y Y −− − + − ≡  of  t Y , the time series { } t Y  strictly Granger causes { } t X  if one 
can reject  () () 11
Ly
tt tt t L y FXI FXI Y −− − =−  for time period t . So past knowledge about past 
values of { } t Y  helps predict current and future values in { } t X . Our bivariate autoregressive 
specification of Granger causality with intercept reads as 
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where the non-autoregressive disturbance terms  1,t υ  and  2,t υ  are i.i.d. and follow a zero mean 
process with constant variance  ( )
2 , 0 σ N . This specification of intertemporal causality of non-
cointegrated, difference stationary series tests whether the coefficients of the lagged 
polynomials of first-order equity and ABS prices,  1 ttt SSS − Δ =−  and  1 ttt B BB − Δ =− , are jointly 
zero on the basis of standard F-tests. We also include the 3-month LIBOR rate  t L  and a 15-
year U.K. bond market benchmark rate  t M  as weakly level stationary, explanatory variables. 
The lag length q is chosen using the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) and the Schwarz information criterion ( S I C ) .  W e  s e l e c t e d  a  
maximum lag of six days. The joint rejection of  01 , 1 1 , 1 , : ... 0 tt j t q H β ββ −− − = == = implies that 
t S Δ  strictly Granger causes  t B Δ . Similar statistical significance of  2,tj α −  across all lagged 
endogenous variables indicates a similar feedback effect of  t B Δ  on  t S Δ . Bi-directional feedback 
as two-way Granger causality exists if both lagged polynomials of the opposite asset class are 
sufficiently significantly different from zero so that the exclusion restriction is rejected. 
 
The Granger causality specification of short-term joint price dynamics indicates statistical 
significance of lagged polynomials of either ABS or equity prices (as past information sets) in 
roughly 40% of all selected ABS-equity pairs of the total sample and sub-samples (see Tabs. 3-
4). The richness of our dataset allows us to estimate Granger causality at different levels of 
statistical significance and across cross-sectional variations of ABS characteristics of both ABS 
categories, CMBS/RMBS and whole business ABS, within the total sample of ABS-equity 
pairs. In the total sample, we reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality of ABS prices 
(at first difference) on equity prices (25.0% of all ABS-equity pairs) more frequently than 
Granger causality of equity prices (14.7% of all ABS-equity pairs). Past ABS prices are 
generally at least twice as likely as past equity prices to Granger cause price movements of 
equity once we narrow the selection of eligible price series data to cointegrated ABS-equity 
pairs and further ABS properties, such as U.K. domiciled issuers, investment grade rating and 
long-term maturity. Upon breaking down the total sample into sub-samples of ABS-equity 
pairs with either CMBS/RMBS or whole business ABS, we detect an intriguing variation in    23 
the explanatory power of lagged polynomials of equity and ABS series. In the subset of ABS-
equity pairs with whole business ABS, price changes of equity series tilt the general pattern of 
joint short-term price dynamics of ABS and equity series against pervasive ABS-based Granger 
causality. Now, past equity prices (at first difference) chip away considerably at the dominant 
ABS discovery and claim higher explanatory power in price discovery almost (or even more 
than) three times as often as past ABS prices. In contrast, the sub-sample of ABS-equity pairs 
with CMBS/RMBS mirrors the general pattern of Granger causality estimates observed for the 
price series data of all ABS-equity pairs (i.e. the total sample of cointegrated series). Here, ABS 
series outscore equity price series in price discovery at a rate of four to one. Despite the weak 
stochastic reliability of Granger causality compared to subsequent estimations based on two-
dimensional vector-based estimations, we can make a coherent case for strong price discovery 
by ABS (equity) prices in ABS-equity pairs with CMBS/RMBS (whole business ABS) at first 
difference invariant of the presence of cointegration concerning short-term co-movements 
with ABS and equity prices. Our findings suggest that the joint price dynamics of both asset 
classes are superior to univariate forecasts of future price changes of either asset class (at least 
over the short-run). The low importance of past information of whole business ABS prices in 
the price formation of equity seems to suggest that whole business ABS series might display 
lower autoregressive effects at higher levels of persistence than corresponding equity series of 
the same issuer compared to CMBS/RMBS series. However, we need to be mindful of the 
change in sample composition as we derive two ABS asset-class specific sub-samples (whole 
business ABS vs. CMBS/RMBS) of different sizes (31 cases vs. 38 cases). Although our (linear) 
Granger causality framework testifies to a consistent pattern of a lead-lag relationship between 
equity and ABS price series, it does not provide conclusive evidence about actual economic 
causality, even if we control for non-linearity bias. Hence, we advance our investigation to a 
vector-based system of simultaneous equations. 
 
5.2   (Unrestricted) Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
 
As a vector-based alternative to Granger causality testing of short-term dynamics, we present a 
two-dimensional vector autoregression (VAR) to analyze the dynamic impact of random 
disturbances on interrelated time series. The linear equation system of VAR assumes 
stationarity of exogenous and endogenous variables without restricting the interrelated time    24 
series to a cointegrating relationship. Since most ABS and equity prices in our sample series are 
not I(0) level stationary, we specify the (unrestricted) VAR of vector  () , tt t X SB ′ =Δ Δ  of equity 
and ABS prices at first differences at time t as
25 
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with C  as a (2x1) vector of constants  1 c  and  2 c ,  t φ  as (2x2) parameter coefficient matrix for 
past  t X  values up to p number of lags,
26  t Ξ  as (2x2) parameter coefficient matrix of vector 
() , tt t ZL M ′ =  of the contemporaneous level controls  t L  (3-month LIBOR rate) and  t M  
(bond market benchmark rate) for the risk-free interest rate and average U.K. corporate bond 
returns, and  t Ε  as (2x1) vector  () () ( )
′ Δ Δ t t B
t
S
t ε ε ,  of non-autoregressive i.i.d. residuals 
( ) ~0 , t N ε Σ .
27 We consider a lag structure without gaps at a maximal autoregressive lag of 
order six to capture the weekly variation of the underlying economic relationship for daily 
observations. The parameter coefficients are estimated as matrix vectors of lagged and 
contemporaneous values of the designated endogenous variables for each ABS-equity pair 
across the sample selection. 
 
5.3  Vector autoregressive error correction model (VECM) 
 
                                                 
25 See also Lutkepohl (1991) for consistent lag order selection in VAR models. 
26 The choice of lag structure and the maximum lag order p reflect a conscious trade-off between over-
parameterization (and the corresponding loss of degrees of freedom) and over-simplification. Since the 
maximum lag order should capture the overall information processing and aggregation time in each 
market, we mainly rely on individual partial autocorrelation of ABS and equity series in our sample 
(Taylor and Peel, 2000) in addition to the Akaike information criterion and the stepwise maximum 
likelihood ratio test. 
27 Errors are uncorrelated with their own lagged values and all endogenous variables, but may be 
contemporaneously correlated with each other. The assumption of not serially correlated residuals is 
not restrictive, since any residual serial correlation could be easily absorbed by an increase of 
polynomial lag p.    25 
Since most ABS-equity pairs exhibit intertemporal (linear) causality with at least one 
cointegration vector, we control for intertemporal price adjustment of cointegrated ABS-
equity pairs to improve our analysis of joint dynamics of past price movements in both equity 
and ABS markets. The intertemporal lead-lag relationship of price discovery indicates which 
market is more efficient in reflecting changes in the quality of the issuer (and the value of 
associated securitized debt). We augment our (unrestricted) VAR specification above by 
introducing a so-called error correction term to account for price adjustment of I(1) cointegrated 
levels of lagged difference series of equity and ABS prices for  ,, it i i it B S αβ =+ , where  i α  and 
i β  are endogenously determined. We apply a two-dimensional (bivariate) vector error 
correction model (VECM) as a restricted VAR (Hamilton, 1994; Davidson and MacKinnon, 
1993) to time series data of ABS-equity pairs that are known to be cointegrated. This 
specification allows us to extend our perspective to the long-term consistency of price dynamics 
and lays the foundation for a more advanced investigation into the economic causality of 
prices in both markets. VECM restricts the long-run behavior of endogenous variables to 
converge to their cointegrating relationships (through price adjustments) while allowing a wide 
range of short-run dynamics of past price movements as random disturbances on joint price 
dynamics within a linear system of simultaneous equations. The degree of cointegration is 
reflected in the specification of the error correction term, which gradually corrects past 
deviations from long-run equilibrium through a series of partial short-run price adjustments. 
Although the cointegration restriction of long-term consistency in VECM does not necessarily 
require level stationarity of the constituent time series, it implies a level stationary I(0) 
difference series of each time series regardless of the individual degree of integration.  
 
We consider VECM with constant drift and no trend for difference stationary series of ABS 
and equity prices at time t with at least one cointegrating vector as 
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where  ,, , tt t CX φ Ξ  and  t Z  are identical to the parameter specification of VAR above. The 
lagged difference between both level series denotes the “error correction term” (or 
“cointegration equation”) as an additional endogenous variable of possible long-term    26 
consistency (with complete cointegration at  0 0 = α  and  1 1 = β ).  Λ  is a (2x1) vector of 
adjustment coefficients  1 λ  (“equity λ ”) and  2 λ  (“ABS λ ”) of the (contemporaneous) error 
correction term. The adjustment coefficients indicate the degree of short term price adjustment 
by movements of equity prices vis-à-vis ABS prices and vice-versa so as to correct pricing 
discrepancies against a long-term trend of difference (covariance) stationarity. If  1 λ  is 
sufficiently positive in the above specification of error correction, ABS prices anticipate price 
changes (e.g. due to changes in the quality of securitized assets) and the mean-reverting 
parameter of equity prices in adjusts to remove pricing errors in response to changes of issuer 
valuation (e.g. due to changes in credit conditions). The converse argument holds and equity 
prices contribute most to price discovery relative to ABS prices  2 λ  is sufficiently negative. The 
(relative) degree of adjustment to price discrepancies is reflected in the economic significance of 
coefficient  . 1 β  So the statistical and economic significance of the error correction term 
indicates which of the two markets lags price changes and how fast price adjustment takes 
place. If (significant) positive values for  1 λ  and negative values for  2 λ  coincide in the λ -vector 
of the error correction term, the relative magnitude of both  1 λ  and  2 λ  coefficients reflects the 
role of each market in price discovery (see Tab. 6).  
 
Besides analyzing the incidence of statistical and economic significance of error correction in 
the ABS and equity equation of VECM individually, we also examine the pattern of joint price 
adjustment of cointegration for each matched ABS-equity pair in our sample. Hence, as a 
succinct representation of the lead-lag relationship between both series, we compute different 
ratios of the respective error correction coefficients to gauge how much each market 
contributes to price discovery. We entertain two indicative measures of relative error 
correction: the (original) GG-test measure  ( ) 112 λ λλ −  by Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and a 
modified version ( ) () 12 1 2 λ λλ λ −+  (“modified GG-test”) thereof, where  1 λ  and  2 λ  denote 
the error correction term coefficients for equity and ABS prices respectively. Both ratio tests 
complement each other to provide instant information about the dominant contribution to 
price discovery and the corresponding adjustment for pricing errors in either market. The GG-
test measure emphasizes the relative magnitude of error correction terms in both the ABS and 
equity equation of VECM, but it does not explicitly check for the signs of the λ  coefficient 
values. In contrast, the modified GG-test measure resembles a sign test of the “right”    27 
combination of error correction coefficients for dominant price discovery of a lead-lag 
relationship. If the GG-test approaches unity, the “equity λ ” dominates, implying that the 
price series of the first term in the error correction term ( ) 101 1 tt BS αβ −− −− of VECM  plays a 
leading role in price discovery and the second term adjusts. If the ratio is close to 0, the roles of 
these two markets reverse. For a measure close to 0.5, both markets equally contribute to price 
discovery and there is no definite evidence of consistent price adjustment in either series over 
time. Positive values of the modified GG-test attribute greater economic significance to price 
adjustment of the second term of the error correction equation, whereas the reverse holds true 
for negative values of the modified GG-test (see Tabs. 7-8). If ABS prices adjust with certainty, 
we find  mod 1 2 1 2 1: 0, 0 GG λ λλ λ =− < > ∀ < > , and in the opposite case of “pure” price discovery 
by equity prices we find  mod 1 2 1 2 1: 0, 0 GG λ λλ λ =< > ∀ ><  (see Fig. 3). 
 
6  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Both the unrestricted and restricted two-dimensional vector-based estimation of intertemporal 
autoregressive effects between equity and ABS prices within a linear system of simultaneous 
equations in VAR and VECM show that lagged prices of each asset class have similar 
statistically significant explanatory power to improve forecasts on the short-term joint price 
dynamics with and without cointegration. In a nutshell, our findings generally conform to 
Hypothesis 1 of a positive long-term consistency of intertemporal causal interaction (co-
movement) between cointegrated equity and ABS prices, where the ABS market contributes 
more to price discovery of issuer valuation (Hypothesis 3), albeit with some variations across 
different sub-samples of ABS security characteristics. Although whole business ABS display an 
economically stronger empirical association with corresponding equity prices (Hypothesis 2), 
the incidence and statistical significance of price discovery is stronger for CMBS/RMBS/other 
ABS (with lower sensitivity to changes in equity value). Hence, we reject Hypothesis 4. 
 
6.1  Lagged polynomials in VAR and VECM 
 
The utility of this exercise lies in the comparative investigation of the statistical and economic 
significance of short-term joint dynamics of pairwise matched equity and ABS price series 
based on the coefficient estimates of lagged polynomials in VAR and VECM specifications. We    28 
investigate the degree to which past information in both markets improves univariate estimates 
of autoregressive effects.  
 
A detailed analysis of the incidence of VAR and VECM estimated coefficients of the lagged 
polynomials at a common level of at least 10% statistical significance testifies to a largely 
positive and statistically significant influence of past joint price dynamics of ABS-equity pairs 
on short-run forecasts of current and future price movements (Hypothesis 1), with greater 
overall economic significance attributable to price information of ABS-equity pairs with whole 
business ABS (Hypothesis 2) and ABS with long maturities. While the lagged polynomials of 
ABS exhibit consistently negative autoregressive effects in both VAR and VECM, we detect 
mostly negative (positive) autoregressive effects in equity prices series up to six lags of past 
price information in VAR (VECM) specifications. We find that controlling for cointegration 
can affect how past knowledge helps improve forecasted price movements (results not 
reported).
 We detect strong and statistically significant autoregressive effects in equity prices 
series up to six lags of past price information in both VAR and VECM specifications.
28 
Autoregressive effects of ABS series tend to be similar to equity only with cointegration 
restriction in VECM. The lagged polynomial of ABS prices (level and first differences) explains 
changes in equity prices only in the subsets of ABS-equity pairs with (i) CMBS/RMBS in both 
VAR and VECM (based on a sufficiently high incidence of significant cases), (ii) whole 
business ABS in VAR (based on a significant FM t-statistic), and (iii) ABS with long maturity 
or investment grade rating (based on a sufficiently high incidence of significant cases). 
Autoregressive effects of equity on ABS prices are limited to ABS-equity pairs with investment 
grade rated ABS in both VAR and VECM (based on a significant FM t-statistic). The 
coincidence of significant FM t-statistics and a high score of significance cases implies little 
skewness in the distribution of coefficient values across all series in the sample (which might 
otherwise bias the statistical significance of parametric testing procedures). However, our 
evidence generally negates the statistical significance of short-term joint dynamics between both 
equity and ABS price series for level data and first differences. 
                                                 
28 We might explain greater explanatory power of past equity prices especially for ABS-equity pairs with 
CMBS/RMBS on the grounds of market liquidity. Issuers of CMBS/RMBS tend to be larger and tender 
more actively traded equity than issuers of whole business ABS, whose lack of operational scale make 
them issue securitized debt only as a complementary source of external finance. Univariate descriptive 
statistics (not reported) of equity prices of issuers of whole business ABS also exhibit higher persistence    29 
 
Our exogenous control factors, the daily level data of the 15-year U.K. bond benchmark and 
the three-month U.K. Sterling LIBOR rate (both obtained from Bloomberg), play a 
economically strong but statistically weak role in both equity and ABS equations of VECM. 
We recognize that the count of significant cases is occasionally inconsistent with the FM t-
statistic owing to a skewed distribution of sample coefficient estimates for these control 
variables. The FM-statistic attributes statistical power to control variables at common levels of 
significance across various sub-samples only without cointegration restriction (VAR). 
 
6.2  Error correction in VECM 
 
We analyze the statistical and economic significance of error correction in the long-run price 
dynamics of equity-ABS pairs based on the individual incidence of positive or negative 
coefficients of error correction and the paired coincidence of price adjustment of pooled 
sample estimates. We summaries the mean and median values of error correction and their 
individual incidence of the error correction coefficients as well as two composite GG-test 
measures for both the entire sample and pre-defined sub-samples of ABS-equity pairs, where 
the ABS price series is either a whole business ABS or a RMBS/CMBS transaction. We also 
control for the degree of statistical significance of price adjustment by four designated 
“significance categories”: (i) both coefficients  1 λ  and  2 λ  are statistically significant (at least at 
the 10% level), (ii) only  1 λ  (i.e. equity price adjustment) is statistically significant (at least at 
the 10% level), (iii) only  2 λ  (i.e. ABS price adjustment) is statistically significant (at least at the 
10% level), and (iv) neither  1 λ  nor  2 λ  is statistically significant (at least at the 10% level). 
Moreover, we qualify our results of intertemporal causality on the following cross-sectional 
properties: (i) presence of one or more cointegration vectors between the price series of 
matched ABS-equity pairs, (ii) issuer domicile of U.K. Sterling denominated ABS/MBS (U.K.-
based issuer vs. U.S. and German issuers), (iii) seniority of the ABS transaction (investment 
grade vs. non-investment grade), and (iv) maturity of the ABS transaction (at least 25 years vs. 
shorter maturities). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the sample period with longer autoregressive cycles than equity series of ABS-equity pairs associated 
with CMBS/RMBS issuers.    30 
6.2.1  Analysis of individual error correction coefficients of VECM 
 
We analyze individual error correction of long-term price consistency in the VECM 
specification of cointegrated ABS-equity pairs by means of both sample mean and median of 
estimated error correction term coefficients  1 λ  and  2 λ  and numerical incidence of positive and 
negative values of error correction (see Tab. 6). We examine cross-sectional variation of mutual 
price adjustment across different cases of statistical coincidence of estimated error correction 
coefficients (“significance categories”) and different types of ABS series. We find that at least 
one  λ -coefficient in VECM of cointegrated ABS-equity pairs is always statistically significant 
at the 10% level or better (based on one-sided p-values). Although the numerical count of error 
correction terms reveals sizeable price adjustment in both markets, we find appreciable 
differences in how much equity and ABS prices contribute to price formation. For all 
cointegrated ABS-equity pairs (Panel A), ABS prices respond to price discrepancies in 94.1% of 
all cases, whereas only 60.8% of all equity issues adjust. Equity prices are almost seven times 
more likely to move ahead in price discovery than the corresponding ABS prices, which lead 
only in 5.9% of all cases. The degree of error correction and price discovery between equity 
and ABS prices seems to depend strongly on the type of ABS, but also on the maturity and the 
rating of ABS. Panels B-C imply a preponderance of positive  1 λ  values (i.e. equity prices 
adjust) with the highest proportional incidence of 64.4% of all cointegrated equity series in the 
total sample of ABS-equity pairs with U.K.-based issuers and 66.7% of cointegrated ABS-equity 
pairs with CMBS/RMBS as ABS asset class. We also record a lower chance of equity-based 
price discovery in ABS-equity pairs with whole business ABS as ABS asset class. Also,  2 λ  
values are highly negative (i.e. ABS prices adjust) in almost every ABS-equity pair throughout 
the sample invariant of cointegration and ABS asset properties. We mark the highest incidence 
of 96.7% for negative  2 λ  values for all cointegrated ABS-equity pairs with 
CMBS/RMBS/other ABS as ABS asset class.  
 
In light of significant individual intertemporal error correction of both ABS and equity prices, 
higher economic significance determines the dominant direction of price discovery between 
these cointegrated series. We find that equity prices tend to adjust twice as strongly as ABS 
prices over the same set of matched series (Hypothesis 3) in almost all sample selections. The    31 
median sample values of  () 12 λ λ  in the total sample of ABS-equity pairs all carry positive 
(negative) signs, irrespective of the “significance category” of the matched λ -coefficients.  
 
We find that the absolute median (mean) values of error correction are consistently higher for 
equity prices than for ABS prices at a multiple of up to 3 (44), which implies economic 
dominance of ABS tranches in price discovery in almost all cases of ABS-equity pairs. Only 
matched series with equity error correction as the lone statistically significant price adjustment 
(at 10% level or less) and cointegrated series of ABS-equity pairs with whole business ABS as 
ABS asset type diverge from the general pattern of absolute dominance of ABS series in price 
discovery. However, negative median sample values of  1 λ  indicate declining error correction 
of equity series in response to ABS price movements. At the same time, corresponding ABS 
series retain a strong inclination of price adjustment based on highly negative  2 λ  values 
(though statistically insignificant). Once we restrict our observations to price series of ABS-
equity pairs with RMBS/CMBS/other ABS, U.K.-based issuers or ABS tranches with 
investment grade ratings or long maturity, our results provide strong support for price 
discovery by the ABS market. We find the most coherent median error adjustment in equity 
markets whenever we disregard whole business ABS prices. In fact, the total sample of ABS-
equity pairs clouds weak ABS price leadership for ABS-equity pairs with whole business ABS 
tranches, especially if we take into consideration our findings from the Granger causality test.  
 
Despite allegedly closer proximity of whole business ABS transactions to the operational 
performance of issuers, stronger price discovery by CMBS/RMBS transactions cannot be 
attributed to longitudinal differences between CMBS/RMBS and whole business transactions 
(in light of positive (negative) correlation of ABS-equity pairs with whole business ABS 
(CMBS/RMBS transactions)). Several conjectures might plausibly explain much weaker price 
discovery of whole business ABS (in rejection of Hypothesis 4) on the grounds of liquidity-
based market risk and information transparency. Higher liquidity from more frequent trading 
activity and higher incidence of synthetic transactions structures in CMBS/RMBS deals (with a 
stronger associated economic linkage to the issuer in the form of payment and insolvency 
guarantees) could facilitate a closer empirical relationship between ABS and equity price    32 
series.
29 Different market liquidity might also be attributable to concentrated “buy and hold” 
ownership by large institutional investors.  
 
The cointegrated relationship between ABS and equity series of the same issuer is marked by 
more economically profound contribution of ABS markets to price discovery in accordance 
with Hypothesis 3. Nonetheless, in cases of equity price adjustment as the only significant 
error correction, our results are inconsistent with the general properties of intertemporal 
causality. In some instances when disparate autoregressive effects and/or time trends of 
matched series impede error correction of equity prices, we also attribute dominant price 
discovery to equity markets. Although this qualification on general price adjustment of equity 
series seems limited in scale and scope, our findings on the basis of simple non-matched counts 
of equity error correction do not betray conclusive evidence of pervasive price leadership by 
ABS markets. 
 
6.2.2  Analysis of paired error correction coefficients of VECM 
 
Unfortunately, the incidence of statistically significance and the economic significance of 
individual price adjustment of both ABS and equity series fails to reflect how  1 λ  and  2 λ  values 
square up against each other in matched λ -pairs in our VECM specification of matched ABS-
equity pairs. For this purpose, we derive the original and a modified GG-test diagnostic from 
the coefficient values of the error correction terms of matched ABS and equity series to 
measure the relative contribution of each market to price discovery (see Tabs. 6-7). We find 
that the values for both GG-tests of matched error correcting λ -pairs remain largely positive 
and stable throughout the entire sample and the designated sub-samples of whole business ABS 
and RMBS/CMBS as well as over most significance categories. The numerical count of 
significance categories of all error correcting λ -pairs reveals only one significant λ  value of 
each λ-pair to be most common (in two thirds of all cases), once we limit our analysis to I(1) 
cointegrated equity-ABS pairs. Most median values of both GG-tests are close to unity every 
time paired adjustment coefficients share the same statistical significance (and to a lesser extent 
when either λ-value represents the only statistically significant error correction). The GG-test 
                                                 
29 Also note that equity of issuers of whole business ABS might be less liquid than the equity of CMBS 
issuers, which tend to be large banks, non-bank financial institutions and real estate agencies.    33 
results imply a preponderance of positive  1 λ  and negative  2 λ , with  12 λ λ > , which suggest 
that ABS investment informs price formation and equity markets almost perfectly adjust to 
price discovery in the ABS market (Hypothesis 3).  
 
We also represent graphically the numerical analysis of paired error correction coefficients at 
different significance categories in Fig. 3. For “perfect” price leadership of ABS (equity) we 
would expect the corresponding λ -pairs to exhibit statistically significant, positive (negative) 
1 λ  and  2 λ  values, where  21 λ λ <   ( ) 12 λ λ < . We represent the preference order of price 
adjustment behavior of ABS and equity price series in segments from 1 (strong evidence of 
ABS lead in price discovery) to 8 (strong evidence of equity lead in price discovery). We find 
most observations (which incidentally also show the most complete statistical significance of 
λ -pairs) in segments 3 and 4. 
 
Our results of price leadership of ABS are weakest for ABS-equity pairs with whole business 
ABS, irrespective of further cross-sectional variation of ABS characteristics, or if statistically 
significant error correction is limited to ABS prices. If we only consider ABS-equity pairs with 
CMBS/RMBS as ABS series, the GG-tests usually retain positive values across all significance 
categories (except in the case of ABS with long-maturity and/or positive correlation when 
only the equity series exhibits statistically significant error correction).
30 For ABS-equity series 
with whole business ABS, however, matched λ -pairs yield consistently negative GG-test 
values whenever the ABS error correction is the only statistically significant price adjustment. 
Interestingly, the cross-sectional restriction of investment grade and/or long-maturity ABS of 
eligible ABS-equity pairs marginally improve both the general statistical significance of λ -pairs 
and the economic significance of ABS-based price discovery. 
 
7  CONCLUSION 
 
In extension to the past literature on the empirical relationship between different asset classes, 
this paper represents the first attempt to measure the intertemporal causal relationship 
between matched price series of equity and ABS issued by the same entity. Over a time period 
                                                 
30 Note that the cross-sectional qualification of co-movement based on issuer domicile, ABS rating and 
maturity as selection criteria does not imply significant selective bias.    34 
of more than five years, we investigated the short-term dynamic linkages and long-term 
consistency of price co-movement of selected price series in these markets, within an 
autoregressive time series framework of a two-dimensional linear system of simultaneous 
equations – with and without the presence of cointegration. We applied bivariate vector 
autoregression (VAR) and Granger causality testing to paired ABS and equity price series to 
better explain how their joint dynamics over the short run as well as their intertemporal lead-
lag relationship inform current and future prices. We also qualified the degree and direction of 
price discovery on various security characteristics of selected ABS, such as issue (credit) 
quality, maturity and the type of ABS transaction (whole business ABS vs. 
CMBS/RMBS/other ABS).  
 
Our methodology generated stylized facts about price co-movement, which might guide future 
research on correlation trading, information dissemination and price formation across different 
capital market sectors. We found that knowledge about the joint dynamics of pairwise 
matched past equity and ABS prices only slightly improved short-term univariate forecasts of 
price movements of both markets based on a VAR specification. Nonetheless, Granger 
causality testing and autoregressive specifications of cointegrated price dynamics with 
correction for intertemporal price adjustment to past innovations revealed that much can be 
learned about the price formation in each market by analyzing the long-term consistency of 
price movements. Generally, our findings delivered compelling empirical evidence of strong 
price co-movement (Hypothesis 1) and endorsed pervasive ABS dominance in price discovery 
between ABS and equity series over time (Hypothesis 3). Our results of long-term consistency 
of price dynamics is economically stronger for cointegrated ABS-equity pairs with whole 
business ABS (Hypothesis 2). However, the magnitude and direction of price discovery by 
ABS markets varies by security characteristics. ABS-equity pairs with large-scale (and 
investment grade rated) CMBS/RMBS transactions exhibited stronger and statistically more 
significant lead-lag relationships than ABS-equity pairs with whole business ABS. In this case, 
ABS prices seemed to contribute little to price discovery over time and were more inclined to 
adjust to price discrepancies vis-à-vis the matched equity price series (in rejection of Hypothesis 
4). We attributed this intriguing result to higher market liquidity and higher incidence of    35 
stronger credit-linkage to the issuer in the (mostly) synthetic transaction structures of 
CMBS/RMBS.
31 
 
This instructive exercise sets the stage for a comprehensive econometric analysis of secondary 
market price dynamics in ABS markets and the changes of correlation risk in synthetic 
structured finance transactions – a largely unexplored area of asset pricing. As financial 
institutions and large corporations administer asset securitization primarily as a premier asset 
funding and hedging mechanism, joint price dynamics inform both sound risk management 
and regulatory policy as regards price discovery and systemic risk between different capital 
market sectors. We are able to ascribe some information benefits to ABS investment based on 
our findings about the joint dynamics of ABS and equity markets within the empirical scope 
of our analysis. 
 
Many extensions to his paper are feasible, such as nonlinear Granger causality testing by means 
of a detailed examination of VAR residuals and the cross-validation of squared errors. 
Additionally, depending on the availability of credit ratings for all equity names in our 
samples, the examination of the impact of issuer credit ratings on the empirical relationship of 
debt and equity prices could help testing Hypothesis 1 more comprehensively. As an 
econometric improvement, we might need to relax our assumption of non-correlated, zero-
mean residuals with unit variance in favor of a transmission mechanism of time-varying 
innovation through ARCH effects. Lastly, the most challenging proposition of a subsequent 
study would be an extension of empirical scope by including highly-frequent secondary market 
data on other ABS markets and/or the inclusion of corresponding bond price information in 
keeping with the analysis of the three-way interaction of CDS, equity and bond prices. 
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9  APPENDIX I: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOND, ABS AND EQUITY PRICES 
 
In synthetic CDO and ABS transactions with on-balance sheet reference assets, the intuition behind the 
empirical relation of securitized debt and equity claims can be assessed based on the valuation of balance 
sheet identities in the context of the capital structure-based option pricing theory (OPT) by Merton 
(1974).
32 According to Merton’ structural model, a firm’s outstanding liabilities constitute a bankruptcy 
level as a “distance to default” threshold. Owners of corporate equity in leveraged firms have the option 
to default if their firm’s asset value (reference asset) declines below the cumulative face value of 
outstanding debt (strike price) owed to bondholders at maturity. Hence, equity and debt are always 
positively correlated. Their correlation increases in higher default risk and leverage, which imply a 
higher probability that the asset value of the firm will drop below the default threshold. Bond and 
equity prices should also be cointegrated and share an equilibrium price relationship. 
 
Merton’s balance sheet approach assumes that the firm’s debt consists of a zero-coupon bond with a 
notional value F and maturity of T periods. The firm’s outstanding liabilities constitute a bankruptcy 
level as a “distance to default”, whose threshold value is density of the standard normal for a given 
probability of default if the firm’s asset process is lognormal. This capital structure-based evaluation of 
contingent claims on firm performance implies that the firm defaults if its asset value is insufficient to 
meet the amount of debt owed to bondholders at maturity. By definition, the firm’s bond price B and 
equity price E are always positively correlated and can be represented as  () () ( )
1
12 1 BE d d d
−
=Φ −Φ −, 
where the firm leverage 
rT dF e V
− =  is the ratio of the face value of outstanding debt F, discounted by 
the risk-free rate r, and the asset value of the firm V, with  ( ) ( )
2
1 log 1 2 dd T T σσ =− + and 
21 dd T σ =− and  Φ as the standard normal c.d.f. So prices of equity and bonds move in same 
direction. The correlation of bond and equity prices increases in the firm’s leverage and approaches 0 
whenever  0 BE→ . Moreover, the proximity of the firm’s asset value to the default threshold, which is 
reflected in the default risk, contributes to a closer association of the valuation of debt and equity on the 
asset value of firms. Since low-rated firms have an asset value just enough to cover debt obligations, a 
small deterioration of asset value causes default, with negative price (co-)movement of debt holders and 
equity holders as residual claimant. Highly-rated firms, in contrast, shed correlation between issued 
equity and debt claims as even larger deteriorations in asset value would not compromise their ability to 
repay existing debt. The positive relation between equity and debt also increases in the leverage ratio, 
                                                 
32 Although the same intuition applies, we acknowledge different economic significance depending on the 
structural characteristics of ABS.    41 
which induces a higher probability that the asset value of the firm will drop below the default threshold 
of outstanding debt at the time of maturity. 
 
10  APPENDIX II: TABLES & FIGURES 
 
10.1  Univariate descriptive statistics: sample composition, stationarity, autocorrelation and 
cointegration 
 
10.1.1  Sample composition 
 
ABS/Equity Sample Composition (cross-sectional) 
total number of equity series (i.e. issuers)  35 
org. total number of ABS tranches (ABS transactions)  81 (48) 
selected number of ABS tranches (ABS transactions)  68 (42) 
  rated by one/two/three rating agencies  11/26/30 
  rated by Moody's/S&P/Fitch  41/44/64 
   jointly rated by   
      Moody's & Fitch  40 
      S&P & Fitch  42 
      Moody's & S&P  30 
composite rating of ABS tranches   
  mean  4.16 (AA-,Aa3) 
  median  3.00 (AA,Aa2) 
  mode  1.00 (AAA,Aaa) 
ABS tranche size   
  mean  ≈ Brit. £283,058,168 
  median  ≈ Brit. £240,000,000 
remaining maturity of tranches (at sample start date)   
  mean/median/mode  26.73/29.16/35.10 yrs. 
remaining maturity of tranches (at sample end date)   
  mean/median/mode  21.33/23.76/29.70 yrs. 
seasoning of tranches (at sample end date)   
  mean/median/mode  3.07/2.90/0.20 yrs. 
 
Tab. 1. Cross-sectional sample descriptives of ABS and equity price series.    42 
10.1.2   Test of correlation and cointegration 
 
Sample correlation measures 
 
mean median 
std. 
dev. 
#  
mean median 
std. 
dev. 
# 
 Panel  A: by rating category 
  Investment Grade Rating    Non-investment grade rating 
level  -0.1503  -0.3216  0.5861 55   0.1367  0.2976  0.6069 13 
1
st 
diff.  -0.0073 -0.0158 0.1587  55    -0.0376  -0.0085 0.0702  13 
 Panel  B: by ABS type 
  Whole Business    CMBS/RMBS/Other 
level  0.1603  0.3608  0.6171 30   -0.3180  -0.4480  0.4829 38 
1
st 
diff.  0.0086 -0.0088 0.1936  30    -0.0303  -0.0199 0.0925  38 
 Panel  C: whole business ABS 
  Investment Grade Rating    Non-investment grade rating 
level  0.1863  0.4196  0.6023 23   0.0750  -0.2836  0.7067 7 
1
st diff.  0.0239 -0.0050 0.2155  23    -0.0416 -0.0476  0.0837  7 
  Panel D: CMBS/RMBS/other ABS 
  Investment Grade Rating    Non-investment grade rating 
level  -0.0298  -0.0255  0.0983 32   0.0778  0.3175  0.5336 6 
1
st 
diff.  -0.0298 -0.0255 0.0983  32    -0.0329  -0.0024 0.0580 6 
 
Tab. 2. Pooled correlation measures of matched ABS and equity pairs by cross-
sectional variation for two sub-samples of whole business ABS and CMBS/RMBS as 
ABS price series. 
 
        No. of cases  Eigenvalue  Trace stat. 
 
   # 
not 
sign. 
≤5%  ≤1% median  mean  median  mean 
        proportional. share (%)        crit. value (5%/1%) 
No. of CE(s)    Panel A: total sample (all ABS-equity pairs) 
H0: None   68  17  11  40  0.042  0.110  21.980***  27.001*** 
        25.0%  16.2%  58.8%        (15.41/3.76) 
H0: At most 1  68  44  12  12  0.004  0.012  2.367  3.543 
        64.7%  17.7%  17.7%        (20.04/6.65) 
No. of CE(s)    Panel B: whole business ABS 
H0: None   30  9  8  13  0.042  0.108  18.913***  22.885*** 
        30.0%  26.7%  43.3%        (15.41/3.76) 
H0: At most 1  30  23  2  5  0.003  0.014  1.204  2.839 
        76.7%  6.7%  16.7%        (20.04/6.65) 
No. of CE(s)    Panel C: CMBS/RMBS/other ABS 
H0: None   38  8  3  27  0.040  0.111  28.116***  30.251*** 
        21.1%  7.9%  71.1%        (15.41/3.76) 
H0: At most 1  38  21  10  7  0.005  0.011  3.429  4.099 
        52.6%  29.0%  18.4%        (20.04/6.65)    43 
 
Tab. 3. Cointegration test of ABS and equity level data: The Johansen test identifies the cointegration 
relationship (i.e. the existence of cointegration vectors (“CE”)) of all matched (68) ABS-equity pairs on a level 
basis. We also test the cross-sectional variation of cointegration relationships for two sub-samples of whole 
business ABS and CMBS/RMBS/other ABS as ABS price series. For each panel we count the cases when the 
null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector cannot (“N.S.”) or can be rejected at the 5%(1%) significance level 
across the entire sample. In the subsequent columns we present median and mean eigenvalues as well as the 
trace statistic (with critical value at the 5%(**) and the 1%(***) significance level) of all matched ABS-equity 
pairs.    44 
 
10.2  Estimation results of short-term dynamics: Granger causality test (linear) 
 
   
Panel A: all series without cointegration 
restriction 
  Panel B: only cointegrated series 
    Total Sample 
    sign. level  no.  % expl.    sign. level  no.  % expl. 
Direction of causality    ≤10%  ≤5%  ≤1%       ≤10%  ≤5%  ≤1%    
[￿Bt] H1: Equity expl. ABS    10  9  2  68  14.71    8  7  2  51  15.69 
[￿St] H1: ABS expl. equity    17  15  9  68  25.00    14  12  8  51  27.45 
Total    27  24 11  68 39.71    22 19 10  51  43.14 
                       
    Whole Business ABS 
    sign. level  no.  % expl.    sign. level  no.  % expl. 
Direction of causality    ≤10%  ≤5%  ≤1%       ≤10%  ≤5%  ≤1%    
[￿Bt] H1: Equity expl. ABS    7  6  2  30  23.33    6  5  2  21  28.57 
[￿St] H1: ABS expl. equity    2  1  -  30  6.67    2  1  -  21  9.52 
Total    9  7 2  30  30.00    8 6 2  21  38.09 
                       
    CMBS/RMBS/other ABS 
    sign. level  no.  % expl.    sign. level  no.  % expl. 
Direction of causality    ≤10%  ≤5%  ≤1%       ≤10%  ≤5%  ≤1%    
[￿Bt] H1: Equity expl. ABS    3  3  -  38  7.89    2  2  -  30  6.67 
[￿St] H1: ABS expl. equity    15  14  9  38  39.47    12  11  8  30  40.00 
Total   18 17 9  38  47.36   14  13 8  30  46.67 
 
Tab. 4. Granger causality test of ABS-equity pairs and sub-samples at first differences without cointegration restriction (Panel A) and 
with cointegration restriction (Panel B). 
    45 
 
   
Panel C: only cointegrated series 
with U.K. issuer of ABS 
  Panel D: only cointegrated series 
with investment grade ABS (S&P 
≥A-) 
  Panel E: only cointegrated series 
with ABS tranche maturity > 25 
yrs. 
    Total Sample 
    sign. level  no.  % expl. 
 
sign. level  no.  % expl. 
 
sign. level  no. 
% 
expl. 
Direction of causality   
≤ 
10% 
≤ 
5% 
≤ 
1%    
 
≤ 
10% 
≤ 
5% 
≤ 
1
%    
 
≤ 
10% 
≤ 
5% 
≤ 
1%    
[￿Bt] H1: Equity expl. 
ABS   8  7  2  45  15.25 
 
5 5  -  39  12.82 
 
4 4 -  37  8.11 
[￿St] H1: ABS expl. equity    13  11  7  45  27.12    11  10  7  39  28.21    14  13  7  37  29.73 
Total    21  28  9  45  42.37   16  15  7  39  41.03   18  17  7  37  37.84 
    Whole Business ABS 
    sign. level  no.  % expl. 
 
sign. level  no.  % expl. 
 
sign. level  no. 
% 
expl. 
Direction of causality   
≤ 
10% 
≤ 
5% 
≤ 
1%    
 
≤ 
10% 
≤ 
5% 
≤ 
1
%    
 
≤ 
10% 
≤ 
5% 
≤ 
1%    
[￿Bt] H1: Equity expl. 
ABS   6  5  -  21  28.57 
 
3 3  -  15  20.00 
 
4 4 -  16  18.75 
[￿St] H1: ABS expl. equity    2  1  -  21  9.52    2  1  -  15  13.00    2  1  -  16  12.50 
Total    8  6  -  21  38.09   6  5  -  15  33.33   6  5  -  16  31.25 
                                   
    CMBS/RMBS/other ABS 
    sign. level  no.  % expl. 
 
sign. level  no.  % expl. 
 
sign. level  no. 
% 
expl. 
Direction of causality   
≤ 
10% 
≤ 
5% 
≤ 
1%    
 
≤ 
10% 
≤ 
5% 
≤ 
1
%    
 
≤ 
10% 
≤ 
5% 
≤ 
1%    
[￿Bt] H1: Equity expl. 
ABS   2  2  -  24  8.33 
 
2 2  -  24 8.33 
 
- -  -  21  - 
[￿St] H1: ABS expl. equity    11  10  7  24  45.83    9  9  6  24  37.50    12  12  7  21  42.86    46 
Total    13  12  7  24  54.16   17  17  9  24  45.88   12  12  7  21  42.86 
 
Tab. 5. Granger causality test of cointegrated ABS-equity pairs at first differences for the sub-samples of ABS-equity pairs of U.K.-based issuers (Panel C), 
investment grade rated ABS (Panel D) and ABS of long maturity (> 25 years) (Panel E). 
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10.3  Estimation results of long-term consistency: individual error correction and GG-tests of VECM 
 
10.3.1  Analysis of individual error correction coefficients (VECM) 
 
  Panel A: all cointegrated series  
Panel B: all cointegrated series with 
whole business ABS 
 
Panel C: only cointegrated series with 
CMBS/RMBS/other ABS 
  Error correction term  1 λ  (Equity) 
     no. (%)         no. (%)         no. (%)   
 mean 
media
n 
pos. neg. #    mean 
media
n 
pos. neg.  #    mean 
media
n 
pos. neg.  # 
1 λ  and  2 λ  sign. 
≤10% 0.739  0.532  75.0%  25.0%  12 
 
0.617 0.648 100.0%  -  5 
 
0.826  0.233 57.1% 42.9%  7 
Equity  1 λ  sign. ≤10%  -6.985 0.001  53.3% 46.7%  15    -0.349 -0.604  50.0%  50.0%  6   -11.409  0.001 55.6% 44.4%  9 
ABS  2 λ  sign. ≤10%  0.096 0.047  58.3% 41.7%  24    -0.048 -0.022  30.0%  70.0% 10   0.199  0.139 78.6% 21.4%  14 
1 λ  and  2 λ  not sign.  -  - -  -  -    -  - -  -  -   -  - - -  - 
Total  -1.835 0.083  60.8% 39.2%  51    0.024 0.033  52.4%  47.6% 21   -3.137  0.139 66.7% 33.3%  30 
                              
  Error correction term  2 λ  (ABS) 
     no. (%)         no. (%)         no. (%)   
   mean 
media
n 
pos. neg. #    mean 
media
n 
pos. neg.  #    mean 
media
n 
pos. neg.  # 
1 λ  and  2 λ  sign. 
≤10% -0.079  -0.056  -  100.0%  12 
 
-0.092 -0.107  -  100.0%  5 
 
-0.070 -0.055  -  100.0%  7 
Equity  1 λ  sign. ≤10%  -0.042 -0.017  20.0%  80.0%  15   0.022 -0.013  33.3%  66.7%  6   -0.084  -0.017 11.1% 88.9%  9 
ABS  2 λ  sign. ≤10%  -0.090 -0.066  - 100.0%  24   -0.116 -0.056  -  100.0% 10   -0.071 -0.067  -  100.0% 14 
1 λ  and  2 λ  not sign.  -  - -  -  -    -  - -  -  -   -  - - -  - 
Total  -0.073 -0.057  5.9%  94.1%  51   -0.071 -0.044  9.5%  90.5% 21   -0.075 -0.058  3.3%  96.7% 30 
 
Tab. 6. Analysis of individual error correction (VECM): The panels show the mean, median and the incidence of significant individual error correction for all ABS-
equity pairs with cointegration restriction (Panel A),  with whole business ABS (Panel B), and with CMBS/RMBS/Other ABS (Panel C). 
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10.4  GG-Tests of error correction coefficients (VECM) 
 
 
Panel A: all series without 
cointegration restriction 
  Panel B: only cointegrated series   Panel C: only U.K. issuers of ABS and 
cointegrated series 
  Total sample 
mod. GG-test (orig. GG-test)  mean median  #    mean median #   mean  median # 
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  sign. 
≤10%  0.597 (0.876)  1.000 (0.905)  14 
 
0.548 (0.960)  1.000 (0.927)  12 
 
0.686 (0.955)  1.000 (0.909)  11 
Equity  1 λ  sign. ≤10%  0.201 (0.997)  0.952 (1.000)  27    0.069 (0.955)  0.897 (1.000)  15    0.094 (0.938)  0.897 (0.965)  11 
ABS  2 λ  sign. ≤10%  0.691 (0.029)  1.000 (0.465)  26    0.713 (-0.145)  1.000 (0.439)  24    0.731 (-0.104)  1.000 (0.449)  23 
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  not sign.  1.000 (0.806)  1.000 (0.806)  1    - -  -    - -  - 
Total  0.482 (0.599)  1.000 (0.920)  68    0.485 (0.438)  1.000 (0.870)  51    0.564 (0.409)  1.000 (0.865)  45 
                  
  Whole Business ABS 
mod. GG-test (orig. GG-test)  mean median  #    mean median #   mean  median # 
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  sign. 
≤10%  1.000 (0.869)  1.000 (0.868)  6 
 
1.000 (0.867)  1.000 (0.858)  5 
 
1.000 (0.867)   1.000 (0.858)  5 
Equity  1 λ  sign. ≤10%  -0.041 (1.046)  -0.490 (1.003)  11    0.002 (0.995)  0.002 (0.984)  6    0.002 (0.995)  0.002 (0.984)  6 
ABS  2 λ  sign. ≤10%  0.469 (-0.277)  0.487 (-0.026)  12    0.478 (-0.757)  0.487 (-0.377)  10    0.478 (-0.757)  0.487 (-0.377)  10 
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  not sign.  1.000 (0.806)  1.000 (0.806)  1    - -  -    - -  - 
Total  0.406 (0.474)  0.925 (0.889)  30    0.466 (0.131)  0.897 (0.840)  21    0.466 (0.131)  0.897 (0.840)  21 
                    
  CMBS/RMBS/other ABS 
mod. GG-test (orig. GG-test)  mean median  #    mean median  #         
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  sign. 
≤10%  0.295 (0.880)  0.894 (0.978)  8 
 
0.225 (1.025)  1.000 (0.979)  7 
 
0.424 (1.027)  1.000 (0.978)  6 
Equity  1 λ  sign. ≤10%  0.367 (0.964)  1.000 (1.000)  16    0.114 (0.928)  1.000 (1.000)  9    0.205 (0.870)  1.000 (0.948)  5 
ABS  2 λ  sign. ≤10%  0.882 (0.292)  1.000 (0.672)  14    0.882 (0.292)  1.000 (0.672)  14    0.925 (0.398)  1.000 (0.724)  13 
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  not sign.  - -  -    - -  -    - -  - 
Total  0.542 (0.699)  1.000 (0.947)  38    0.549 (0.654)  1.000 (0.653)  30    0.650 (0.653)  1.000 (0.869)  24 
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Tab. 7. Aggregate analysis of paired error correction coefficient based on the modified GG-test, ( ) ( ) 12 1 2 λ λλ λ −+ , and the original GG-test  ( ) 2 1 1 λ λ λ − , of all 
ABS-equity pairs without cointegration restriction (Panel A), with cointegration restriction (Panel B) and cointegrated ABS-equity pairs with U.K.-based issuers 
(Panel C). 
 
 
Panel D: only cointegrated ABS with 
investment grade rating (S&P ≥A-) 
  Panel E: only cointegrated ABS with 
maturity > 25 yrs. 
  Panel F: only cointegrated ABS-
equity pairs with positive correlation 
  Total sample 
mod. GG-test (orig. GG-test) mean  median #   mean  median #   mean  median  # 
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  sign. 
≤10%  0.397 (0.982)  1.000 (0.946)  9 
 
0.397 (0.982)  1.000 (0.946)  9 
 
0.783 (0.938)  1.000 (0.858)  7 
Equity  1 λ  sign. ≤10%  0.003 (0.986)  0.002 (1.000)  14    -0.074 (0.995)  -0.893 (1.000)  13    0.032 (0.996)  0.053 (0.988)  4 
ABS  2 λ  sign. ≤10%  0.761 (-0.361)  1.000 (0.465)  12    0.748 (-0.385)  1.000 (0.429)  15    0.745 (-0.473)  1.000 (0.429)  9 
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  not sign.  - -  -    - -  -    - -  - 
Total  0.364 (0.524)  1.000 (0.939)  35    0.374 (0.433)  1.000 (0.909)  37    0.616 (0.314)  1.000 (0.795)  20 
                     
  Whole Business ABS 
mod. GG-test (orig. GG-test)  mean median  #    mean median #   mean  median  # 
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  sign. 
≤10%  1.000 (0.880)  1.000 (0.902)  3 
 
1.000 (0.880)   1.000 (0.902)  3 
 
1.000 (0.867)  1.000 (0.858)  5 
Equity  1 λ  sign. ≤10%  0.002 (0.995)  0.002 (0.984)  6    0.002 (0.995)   0.002 (0.984)  6    0.369 (0.990)  1.000 (0.965)  3 
ABS  2 λ  sign. ≤10%  0.546 (-1.310)  0.528 (-0.473)  6    0.599 (-1.103)   1.532 (-0.440)  7    0.541 (-1.269)  0.442 (-0.632)  5 
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  not sign.  - -  -    - -  -    - -  - 
Total  0.419 (0.050)  1.000 (0.948)  15    0.450 (0.055)  1.000 (0.948)  16    0.678 (0.074)  1.000 (0.840)  13 
                     
  CMBS/RMBS/other ABS 
mod. GG-test (orig. GG-test)  mean median  #    mean median #   mean  median  # 
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  sign. 
≤10%  0.095 (1.034)  0.242 (0.997)  6 
 
0.095 (1.034)  0.242 (0.997)  6 
 
0.095 (0.191)  0.242 (0.484)  2 
Equity  1 λ  sign. ≤10% 
0.004 (0.980)  0.011 (1.000)  8 
 
-0.139 (0.995)  -0.978 (1.000)  7 
 
-0.139 (-0.277) 
-0.978 (-
1.955) 1 
ABS  2 λ  sign. ≤10%  0.977 (0.589)  1.000 (0.672)  6    0.879 (0.244)  1.000 (0.672)  8    1.000 (0.522)  1.000 (0.561)  4 
Both  1 λ  and  2 λ  not sign.  - -  -    - -  -    - -  -    50 
Total  0.323 (0.879)  1.000 (0.964)  20    0.316 (0.879)  1.000 (0.964)  21    0.501 (0.761)  1.000 (0.724)  7 
 
Tab. 8. Aggregate analysis of paired error correction coefficient based on the modified GG-test, ( ) ( ) 12 1 2 λ λλ λ −+ , and the original GG-test  ( ) 2 1 1 λ λ λ − , of 
all cointegrated ABS-equity pairs with investment grade rated ABS (Panel D), long maturity (> 25 years) (Panel E) and positive pairwise correlation on levels 
(Panel F).    51 
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Fig. 3. Long-term consistency of price dynamics: VECM-based estimation of the error correction term (“equity 
λ”, λ1, and “ABS λ”, λ2) of all cointegrated ABS and equity prices over the entire sample of matched ABS-
equity pairs. The alpha-numerical sector preference (1-8) is geared towards statistically and economically 
significant price discovery by the ABS market. Observations of error correction coefficients in sectors B and C 
indicate "pure plays" of dominant price discovery by ABS and equity price information respectively. We also 
distinguish the statistical importance of error correction on the basis of “significance categories” 1-3, which 
indicate that both ABS and equity show statistically significant error correction (1), only the equity series shows 
statistically significant error correction (2) or only the ABS series shows statistically significant error correction 
(3). 
 